Governor or Dynasty?: Implications on Philippine Local Governments

The dispute between Makati and Taguig over the EMBO barangays in the past year reminded me of one adjective many Filipinos think of when describing Metro Manila: disorganized. Among the casualties of this dispute are a subway system in the country’s largest Central Business District (CBD) and the benefits of the residents of the EMBO (Enlisted Man’s Barrio) barangays in Taguig. One cannot help but wonder: are we really left to the whims of local dynasties? Can the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) or other government bodies intervene?

Unfortunately, the MMDA is a contradiction. It is given power over services within Metro Manila but lacks the power to enforce or execute these powers on its own. The declaration of policy in Republic Act 7924 states that:

“It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to treat Metropolitan Manila as a special development and administrative region and certain basic services affecting or involving Metro Manila as metro-wide services more efficiently and effectively planned, supervised and coordinated by a development authority as created therein, without prejudice to the autonomy of the affected local government units.”

The law gives the development authority the power to plan, supervise, and coordinate services within Metro Manila but explicitly states that the said development authority must still respect the autonomy of the local government units (LGUs). In effect, any decision made by the MMDA can be overridden by the LGUs on the grounds of their autonomy being violated. This autonomy is further reinforced in Section 2, which creates the MMDA:

“The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila without diminution of the autonomy of the local government units concerning purely local matters.”

Therefore, the MMDA can only act with the approval of its constituent LGUs. Given that the agency lacks the ability to collect its own taxes and is reliant upon funding from the national government and contributions from the LGUs, Therefore, it is essentially powerless on most matters besides traffic enforcement.

Art by Ree Bancod

The case of Makati and Taguig

To better understand this issue, the aforementioned Makati-Taguig dispute provides a clear example. The LGU-supported Makati subway project would have served as an important public transport link to the congested central business district. However, due to the EMBO dispute, half the stations of the system and its train depot would no longer be in Makati but in Taguig instead. This necessitates cooperation between the private proponent of the subway system and the governments of Makati and Taguig, an approach that appears unlikely to happen given the bitter political feuding between the Binays of Makati and the Cayetanos of Taguig.

Additional casualties of this dispute are the various social welfare benefits of the residents of the EMBO barangays. These residents previously enjoyed health benefits under Makati’s yellow card program, which entitled residents to free checkups, medicine and hospitalizations, among other benefits. Following the transfer of these barangays, EMBO residents are now covered by the health programs of Taguig, whose budget is spread more thinly over the rest of Taguig’s larger population. According to Taguig’s 2023 budget, a total of 2.4 billion pesos was allocated for healthcare which corresponded to 2,720 pesos spent per person using the data from the 2020 census. Using this same census, accounting for the added population of the EMBO barangays, as well as the 2024 healthcare budget of Taguig yielded per capita spending of 2,791 pesos. To compare, the Makati healthcare budget for the same year allocated 6,569 pesos per person, assuming the EMBO barangays are still considered in its population count.

With all this chaos regarding the infrastructure projects and social welfare programs of individual LGUs, a more organized and centralized body in charge of all these services could offer a solution. The autonomy of the LGUs certainly brings benefits in that it allows these LGUs to tackle issues specific to their jurisdiction and territory. This autonomy, however, forces one to deal with different ordinances and policies when engaging with each of the different LGUs. This inconsistency can be a cause of headaches for both residents, such as those of the EMBO barangays, as well as businesses, such as the private proponent of the Makati subway project in that they are forced to engage with two separate and competing bureaucracies.

The creation of a central body for the Metro, such as that of a provincial-level body with a governor, that would be capable of directing infrastructure projects within its borders and instituting a single, unified social welfare program would eliminate the uncertainty that is present with the current decentralized network of LGUs. This endeavor entails a larger bureaucracy. Therefore, significant organization and reorganization of the current bureaucratic system of all the component LGUs would have to occur. 

There is in fact precedent for such an administrative shift. In 1975, the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) was established which had control over all the LGUs under it as well as the power to levy taxes. The Commission was then also ruled by a governor who at the time was Imelda Marcos. The MMC was then replaced by the Metro Manila Authority, a body with far less power than the MMC. This body would go on to be replaced by the MMDA. 

While this proposal presents its own issues, most of this reorganization would be standardization and rationalization of the processes and benefits; most of the existing bureaucratic personnel would need not be extensively moved around. Such changes would also allow all residents of the Metro to enjoy a more equal standard of services.

Again, let us take the case of Makati and Taguig. The populations of Makati and Taguig post-EMBO transfer would be 292,743 and 1,223,595 respectively. Makati’s budget was 19.7 billion pesos as of 2024 while Taguig’s budget was 21 billion pesos. It can be seen that per capita, Makati spends 67,294 pesos per capita while Taguig can only afford to spend 17,162 pesos per capita. This difference is not only present between Makati and Taguig, but between all the LGUs of Metro Manila. Manila spends 12,564 pesos per capita, Quezon City 13,175 pesos per capita, and Parañaque 17,971 pesos per capita. With this disparity in per capita spending, residents in each LGU may expect differing quality in the services provided to them. With the introduction of a more centralized body, the revenue generated by the Metro as a whole can be more evenly distributed among all its residents.

It is important to note that all of these changes are not possible with the current MMDA as these changes can be seen to violate the autonomy of the individual LGUs. It is in issues between LGUs that the national government is commonly expected to step in. 

Where does the national government fit into all of this?

Presently, the national government is responsible for big ticket projects within the Metro such as the Metro Manila Subway (MMS). This is due to the national government possessing greater authority over the LGUs as well as possessing a greater capability to finance large projects–powers the MMDA does not have. While resorting to the national government can be a solution, it presents an issue regarding the scope of the national government itself.

While Metro Manila is indeed the seat of government and economic center of our  country, the national government overly prioritizes Metro Manila. For Fiscal Year (FY) 2024, the infrastructure expenditure of the government for Metro Manila stood at 52.7 billion pesos, far ahead of similarly populated regions such as Calabarzon and Central Luzon which both stood at around 20 billion pesos. The sheer size of the Metro and the manner of its administration forces the national government to split its attention between two areas: Metro Manila and everywhere else. This only fuels the perception outside the Metro that the national government focuses solely on Metro Manila at the expense of other parts of the country. Having a political middleman such as that of the governor between the national government and the LGUs could potentially allow the national government to worry less about Metro Manila’s issues and development and prioritize more on other nationwide issues that need more attention. 

What can be done?  

For Metro Manila, the introduction of a governor and their associated legislative assembly and government towards our political system would serve as the centralized body in charge of providing and directing welfare, infrastructure projects and other services. All these positions would have to be elected officials, granting them legitimacy and authority over the LGU heads. Without this legitimacy, the new governor could potentially be seen only as a puppet of the national government, such as the administrative positions within the MMDA. Without a regional government, the national government would be forced to step in to serve as the regional coordinator and government with all the problems that come with such an arrangement. With the introduction of a provincial-level administration, the bureaucratic mess Philippine development projects are known for could be reduced at the Metro Manila level. With the introduction of some level of centralized oversight, the inconsistencies between the LGUs of Metro Manila can be rectified to a degree which could allow for a more streamlined process of development without requiring national government intervention.

However, it is still important to recognize the value of local autonomy over local affairs. Therefore, the LGUs would still retain a certain level of autonomy as cities themselves. This would necessitate an amendment to the Local Government Code of 1991 which would allow for cities with a certain level of autonomy while still answering to the provincial or regional government. Such a change will be difficult, requiring significant political will in Congress, but not impossible.

It is significant to mention political dynasties in the Philippines. A governorship could upset the current political order in Metro Manila, where each individual LGU has its own dynasties. Besides the Binays and the Cayetanos, there is also the Aguilar family in Las Piñas, the Abalos family in Mandaluyong, the Malapitan family in Caloocan, and many others in the various LGUs of Metro Manila. The creation of a higher office with considerable power over the LGUs could prompt a war between the dynasties over influence and control of the governorship. As such, dynasties could pose a serious threat to the long-term effectiveness of the governorship. Political dynasties are a national issue and therefore require national attention to rectify. Only with enough political reform, that which destroys the power of the dynasties, can the true effectiveness of the governorship be realized.

All these changes can only be met with enough political will. In the meantime, inter-LGU cooperation on a greater scale can serve as a temporary solution to these issues. This can be made possible by increased action by residents of the various LGUs of Metro Manila, all calling for increased cooperation. However, I believe the end goal must be the implementation of all the aforementioned changes as the potential benefits to the quality of our Metro.